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own problem solving and to interact with other community
members. The interactions typically involve agents cooper-
ating and communicating with one another in order to
enhance their individual problem solving and to better
solve the overall application problem. Each agent consists
of an ARCHON Layer (AL) and an application program
(known as an Intelligent System (IS)). Purpose-built ISs
can make use of the ARCHON functionality to enhance
their problem solving and to improve their robustness.
However pre-existing ISs can also be incorporated, with a
little adaptation, and can experience similar benefits (Jen-
nings et al., 1993). This latter point is important because in
many cases developing the entire application afresh would
be considered too expensive or too large a change away
from proven technology (Jennings and Wittig, 1992).
To successfully incorporate both purpose-built and pre-
existing systems, community design must be carried out
from two different perspectives simultaneously. A top
down approach is needed to look at the overall needs of the
application and a bottom up approach is needed to look at
the capabilities of the existing systems. Once the gap
between what is required and what is available has been
identified, the system designer can choose to provide the
additional functionality through new systems, through
additions to the existing systems, or through the ARCHON
software itself. This methodology, which is described more
thoroughly in Varga et al. (1994), shapes the design proc-
ess by providing guidelines for problem decomposition and
distribution which reduce inefficiencies.
This paper is organised along the following lines: section
two provides an overview of the ARCHON architecture.
Section three describes the Iberdrola application - it
involves seven heterogeneous agents, a substantial number
of which were purpose built, which perform three main
types of activity (data acquisition, fault diagnosis, and serv-
ice restoration) and cooperate in a number of different
styles. Finally, section four highlights some key experi-
ences which impact upon the design and implementation of
future DAI systems.
The Archon Framework
The ARCHON software has been used to integrate a wide
variety of application program types under the general
assumption that the ensuing agents will be loosely coupled
and semi-autonomous. The ISs themselves can be hetero-
geneous - in terms of their programming language, their
1. Iberdrola is a large Spanish electric utility. Their transport net-
work, on which this application operates, is controlled by the
North Dispatch Control Room (DCR) located in Bilbao.
† The work described in this paper was supported by the ESPRIT
II project P2256 (ARCHON)
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the context of the ARCHON project has provided a number of
important insights into these issues. By providing an in depth
analysis of ARCHON’s electricity transportation management
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Introduction
In many industrial applications a substantial amount of
time, effort and finance has been devoted to developing
complex and sophisticated software systems. These sys-
tems are often viewed in a piecemeal manner as isolated
islands of automation, when, in reality, they should be seen
as components of a much larger business function (Jen-
nings, 1994a). The main benefit of taking a holistic
perspective is that the partial subsystems can be integrated
into a coherent and consistent super-system in which they
work together to better meet the needs of the entire appli-
cation. By the very fact that they are integrated, the finite
budgets available for information technology development
can be made to go further - consistent and up-to-date ver-
sions of the data can be shared by all the problem solvers,
basic functionalities need only be implemented in one
place, problem solving can make use of timely information
which might not otherwise be available, and so on.
Two components are required to develop a well-struc-
tured DAI system: a software framework which provides
assistance for interaction between the constituent subcom-
ponents and a design methodology which provides a means
of structuring these interactions. ARCHON addresses both
of these facets: providing a decentralised software platform
which offers the necessary control and level of integration
to help the subcomponents to work together and devising a
concomitant methodology which offers guidance on how
to decompose the overall application and how to distribute
the constituent tasks throughout the community to make
best use of the capabilities of the ARCHON framework.
Both of these facets have been applied to a number of real
world industrial applications (Jennings, 1994b) - however
here the electricity transportation management application
developed and run on-line at Iberdrola1 is the main focus.
ARCHON’s individual problem solving entities are
called agents; these agents have the ability to control their
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(INVITED PAPER)algorithm, their problem solving paradigm, and their hard-
ware platform - as their differences are masked by a
standard AL-IS interface. An AL views its IS in a purely
functional manner, it expects to invoke functions (tasks)
which return results, and there is a fixed language (Cock-
burn and Jennings, 1995) for managing this interaction.
In an ARCHON community there is no centrally located
global authority, each agent controls its own IS and medi-
ates its own interactions with other agents (acquaintances).
The system’s overall objectives are expressed in the sepa-
rate local goals of each community member. Because the
agents’ goals are often interrelated, social interactions are
required to meet global constraints and to provide the nec-
essary services and information. Such interactions are
controlled by the agent’s AL.
In more detail, an agent’s AL needs to: control tasks
within its local IS (monitor), decide when to interact with
other agents (planning and coordination module) (for
which it needs to model the capabilities of its own IS and
the ISs of the other agents - agent information management
(AIM) module), and communicate with its acquaintances
(high level communication module) (ﬁg. 1).
Monitor
The Monitor is responsible for controlling the local IS.
Each IS task is represented in the Monitor by a monitoring
unit (MU). MUs present a standard interface to the Moni-
tor whatever the host programming language and hardware
platform of the underlying IS. Figure 2 shows a graphical
representation of a MU called UpdateTopologyWith-
Alarms which takes ALARM-MESSAGES and
DISTURBANCE-ID as inputs and produces UPDATED-
TOPOLOGY as an output. The IS task associated with this
MU is called UpdateTopologyWithAlarms in the
AL and topology_update in the IS.
MUs can send and receive messages (directives, conﬁr-
mations and requests) to and from the IS. All messages
have to pass through the AL-IS interface which performs
the translation and interpretation required for the IS to
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understand the AL directives and for the AL to understand
the IS messages.
MUs represent the ﬁnest level of control in the AL, at the
next level of granularity there are plans. Plans are pre-speci-
ﬁed acyclic OR-graphs in which the nodes are MUs and the
arcs are conditions. These conditions can: be dependant on
data already available from previously executed MUs in the
plan, be dependant on data input to the plan when it started,
make use of the locking mechanism for critical sections of the
plan, or be used to return intermediate results before a plan
has completed.
A sample plan which starts the fault diagnosis activity is
shown in figure 3. Firstly, ALARM-MESSAGES are used as
an input to the SetNewFault MU which notes that there is
a new fault in the network and generates a new identifier
(DISTURBANCE-ID) for it - this identifier is returned as one
of the plan’s intermediate results. The alarm messages and
the disturbance identifier are then used as inputs to the previ-
ously described UpdateTopologyWithAlarms MU.
When this MU is complete, the model of the network on
which the diagnosis will be based is up to date and hence the
process of identifying a potential list of faults can commence.
There are two ways this activity can proceed: firstly, it is
checked whether a list of generated hypotheses has already
been provided (and stored in the domain data component of
AIM) by an agent called BRS in which case these should
form the start point (the HypothesisGeneration-
FromForeignSource MU should be executed). If no
pertinent information is available then the list should be gen-
erated from scratch (the HypothesisGeneration MU
should be executed). In the latter case, the plan returns the list
of generated hypotheses as an intermediate result so that they
can be used elsewhere within the agent or even disseminated
to relevant acquaintances.
The plan mechanism has an inbuilt backtracking facility
which can be used to express preferences and deal with com-
plex alternatives. Consider the plan ReceiveAlarms
(ﬁgure 4) which determines what course of action an agent
should take when it receives alarm messages. Here there are
three cases: (i) see whether the alarms correspond to an
ongoing fault which is known about; (ii) see whether the mes-
sages have been generated by planned maintenance
(manœuvres) on the network; or (iii) see whether the alarms
correspond to a new fault. The Monitor ﬁrst tries the leftmost
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updatebranch and executes the OngoingFault MU - if this is
unable to give a disturbance identiﬁer for the alarms then
they cannot correspond to a known fault and so this branch
fails; if, on the other hand, an identiﬁer is found then the
rest of the branch is traversed. In the case of failure, the
plan mechanism backtracks up to the last successful execu-
tion (MU CollectAlarms) and tries the next branch
(the Manoeuvres MU) - this branch fails if the distur-
bance identiﬁer associated with the alarms is not given the
tag “MANOEUVRES”. Finally, if the alarms are not gen-
erated by manœuvres then they correspond to a new fault
and so the StartNewDiagnosis branch, as described
in ﬁgure 3, is invoked (this branch never fails and so the
ReceiveAlarms plan will successfully terminate when
the plan has been completed).
The highest level at which the IS’s activities are repre-
sented is the behaviour level. Behaviours contain a plan, a
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trigger condition for activating the behaviour, descriptions of
the inputs needed by the activity and the results which will
be produced, and any children of the behaviour. There are
two types of behaviour: those that are visible to the PCM
(and the other AL components) and those that are purely
internal to the Monitor. The former type are called skills and
they may be triggered by new data (either arriving from other
agents or which the agent has generated itself) or by direct
requests from other agents.
Planning and Coordination Module (PCM)
The PCM is the reflective part of the AL, reasoning about the
agent’s role in terms of the wider cooperating community
(Jennings and Pople, 1993). This module has to assess the
agent’s current status and decide which actions should be
taken in order to exploit interactions with others whilst en-
suring that the agent contributes to the community’s overall
well being. Specific examples of the PCM’s functionality in-
clude: deciding which skills should be executed locally and
which should be delegated to others, directing requests for
cooperation to appropriate agents, determining how to re-
spond to requests from other agents, and identifying when to
disseminate timely information to acquaintances who would
benefit from receiving it.
The PCM is composed of generic rules about cooperation
and situation assessment which are applicable in all industri-
al applications - all the domain specific information needed
to define individual behaviour is stored in the self and ac-
quaintance models. The former contains information about
the local IS and the latter contain information about the other
agents in the system with which the modelling agent will in-
teract. For example, in order to determine how to obtain in-
formation which is needed to execute a behaviour but which
is not currently available, the PCM will make reference to its
self model to see if the information can be provided locally
by executing an appropriate skill. If the information cannot
be provided locally then the acquaintance models are
checked to see if another community member can provide it.
The ﬁnal major role of the PCM is to deal with requests ar-
riving from other agents. By reference to its self model, it
will decide whether to honour the request and will then acti-
vate the necessary skill to provide the requested data; when
the information is available it will ensure that a reply is di-
rected to the source of the request.
Agent Information Management Module
The AIM module is a distributed object management system
which was designed to provide information management
services to cooperating agents (Tuijnman and Afsarmanesh,
1993). Within ARCHON, it is used to store both the agent
models and the domain level data.
As an illustration of the agent models, consider an agent
which is capable of producing information about ALARM-
MESSAGES. The interest slots of its acquaintance models
contain those agents who are interested in receiving this
information and the conditions under which they are inter-
ested. The following portion of the acquaintance model
speciﬁes that an agent called BRS is interested in ALARM-
MESSAGES which contain chronological information, that
an agent called AAA is interested only in non-chronological
alarm messages, and that an agent called BAI is only inter-
ested in non-chronological alarm messages which have the
string INT within their ALARMS ﬁeld:
INTEREST-DESCRIPTOR
INFORMATION-NAME: ALARM-MESSAGESINFORMATION-CONDITION:
[ (“BRS”, (CONTAIN (ALARM-MESSAGES “CHRONO “YES””)));
(“AAA”, (CONTAIN (ALARM-MESSAGES “CHRONO “NO””)));
(“BAI”, (AND (CONTAIN (ALARM-MESSAGES “CHRONO “NO””))
(CONTAIN (ALARM-MESSAGES.ALARMS “INT”)));]
In many industrial applications the domain level data
which the agents need to exchange has a complex internal
structure. In ARCHON, this structure is specified and
maintained by AIM. For example, the information type
ALARM-MESSAGES is defined in the following manner:
ALARM-MESSAGES
AGENT-ID: AGENT DISTURBANCE-ID: SOURCE
CHRONO: Y-N-FLAG BLOCK-TYPE: BLOCK-TYPE
BLOCK-ID: ID-TYPE ALARMS: LIST-OF-ALARMS
where each of the following types has the following set or
permissable values: agent (CSI | AAA), source
(yymmddhhmmss | MANOEUVRES | UNKNOWN), y-n-
ﬂag (YES | NO), block-type (UNIQUE | UNKNOWN |
MIXED), id-type (yymmddhhmmss), and list-of-alarms
(alarm1, .... alarmn).
High Level Communication Module
The High Level Communication Module (HLCM) allows
agents to communicate with one another using services
based on the TCP/IP protocol. The HLCM incorporates the
functionality of the ISO/OSI Session Layer which continu-
ously checks communication links and provides automatic
recovery of connection breaks when possible.
Electricity Transport Management
Energy management is the process of monitoring and con-
trolling the cycle of generating, transporting and
distributing electrical energy to industrial and domestic
customers. Generation transforms raw energy into a more
accessible form. Energy is then transported from its gener-
ation site to the consumer. To minimise losses during
transportation, the electrical voltage is made high (132 kV
or above) before it is placed on a transport network and
sent over many hundreds of kilometres. Finally, the voltage
is lowered and electricity is delivered to the consumers
using a distribution network.
To ensure the transportation network remains within the
desired safety and economical constraints, it is equipped
with a sophisticated data acquisition system (SCADA) and
several conventional application programs which help the
operator (control engineer) to analyse it (these programs
are primarily designed for normal operating conditions).
The network’s operation is monitored from a DCR and
whenever an unexpected event occurs hundreds of alarms
are automatically sent to it by the SCADA system. Under
these circumstances the operator has to rely on experiential
knowledge to analyse the information, diagnose the situa-
tion, and take appropriate remedial actions to return the
network to a safe state. To reduce the operators’ cognitive
load in such circumstances, and to help them make better
decisions faster, Iberdrola decided that a number of deci-
sion support systems should be developed. These systems
were then interconnected and subsequently extended using
ARCHON technology - for a more detailed analysis refer
to Jennings et al. (1995).
Why use DAI techniques?
When Iberdrola decided, in 1988, to implement decision
support tools to ease the workload of their control engi-
neers during disturbances, several technical factors
affected their design choices. Firstly, the control system
itself was a proprietary product from a control systems sup-
ply company - thus it was considered too risky and too
difficult to embed the additional functionality directly within
it. Secondly, the state of the art for commercial systems in
this domain meant that the diverse support functions could
only be realised through a number of standalone systems.
Consequently, Iberdrola built separate decision support sys-
tems to assist with different aspects of the control engineer’s
job - the one which is most relevant to the subsequent discus-
sion is the alarms analysis expert system which diagnosed
faults produced in the network based on the alarm messages
which arrived at the DCR. Their decision support systems
were unconnected apart from the fact that they retrieved
information about the network from the same source (the
control system’s real time database). To make this informa-
tion available to the non-proprietary software products a
number of interfaces to the control system had to be written
- as well as providing access, these interfaces could filter and
pre-process network information.
By 1991, however, some important changes had occurred:
(i) the evolution of IT hardware and software had signifi-
cantly increased the quantity and quality of the data which
could be acquired from the transport network; (ii) distributed
computing had become commercially viable because of
improvements in local area network technology; and (iii) the
prices of computers had decreased significantly so that pow-
erful machines were no longer prohibitively expensive.
Taken together, these changes meant that better and more
powerful tools could be built to assist the control engineer. In
particular it was considered important to be able to actually
perform and dynamically monitor the service restoration
process and also to exploit the new data sources, such as
chronological information or faster rate snapshots, which
became available. However the tried and tested decision sup-
port tools were still needed. Thus it was decided to adopt a
system upgrading strategy which enabled the previously
operational components to be used in conjunction with the
new functionality. Two means of realising this strategy were
considered: extend the existing systems to cover the new fea-
tures or follow a distributed approach and allow the new
functionality to be expressed as distinct computational enti-
ties which could interact with the pre-existing systems
through a common distribution platform. The second option
was chosen because it was considered to be the most effec-
tive means of:
(i) Permitting reasoning based on information of different
granularity. Two types of alarm, chronological and non-
chronological, now needed to be dealt with. In non-chrono-
logical alarms, the time stamped is coincident with the time
of acquisition by the control system, whereas in chronologi-
cal alarms the time stamped is coincident with the actual
occurrence of the event. As chronological alarms represent a
more accurate picture of events in the network they generally
lead to a swifter diagnosis, however they have the disadvan-
tage that chronological information has a low priority in
Iberdrola’s communication channels. Thus when the chan-
nels are saturated (as can happen during a disturbance) their
availability time is unpredictable. For these reasons it was
decided to build a new alarm analysis expert system which
utilised chronological information and could subsequently
integrate its results with those of the pre-existing system,
rather than construct a monolithic system which received
both types of data and had to embody both types of diagnos-
tic knowledge. A similar situation occurs when considering
service restoration. Two types of information are relevant to
this activity: snapshots (which provide a comprehensive pic-ture of the current state of all the components in the
network) and alarm messages (which show how the state
of the components has changed over a period of time). The
former can be produced relatively quickly and give a com-
plete picture of the system’s state, whereas the latter may
take several minutes for a large disturbance but are needed
to indicate the type of fault from which the system must be
restored. Rather than trying to place both types of informa-
tion and reasoning in a single system it seemed more
natural to develop a service restoration subsystem which
dealt mainly with snapshots and received the necessary
high-level information about the equipment at fault from a
diagnosis subsystem (rather than trying to deal with the raw
alarm messages itself).
(ii) Allowing different network models to be included
within the same system. Some of the problem solvers
needed to work on the SCADA model of the network,
while others needed the applications network model (a
model which permits network equations to be solved and
takes the physical characteristics of all its components into
account). Rather than trying to combine and harmonise
these complex and disparate models at design time, it was
decided that each subsystem should work on whichever
model was most appropriate for its task. Then the various
components should be able to interact at runtime to resolve
any inconsistencies which arise from their use of different
network models.
(iii) Enabling a number of different problem solving para-
digms to be utilised. The diverse range of activities which
needed to be performed in this application meant that there
was no universally best problem solving paradigm: proce-
dural techniques were required for algorithmic calculations
like connectivity (to know which component is connected
to which other) and load-flow analysis (solution of the net-
work equations), whereas symbolic reasoning based on
heuristic search was the best approach to diagnosis. A dis-
tributed approach enabled each component to be encoded
in the most appropriate method.
(iv) Meeting the application’s performance criteria. Trans-
portation management is a time-critical application and as
many different types of information can be processed in
parallel, with only a small synchronisation overhead, the
response time of the overall system can be improved
through the use of a number of interconnected machines.
Having decided upon a distributed approach, a choice
had to be made between using more conventional distrib-
uted processing techniques or DAI techniques - here the
latter was adopted for the following reasons: (Barandiaran
et al., 1991; Abel et al., 1993)
(i) Economy: The alarms analysis expert system was
already operational, however new functionality needed to
be added and new information needed to be treated. It was
estimated that the cost of modifying the extant system was
significantly larger than that of implementing a new one.
However it was also judged that as the new functionalities
and data were so diverse that it would be an extremely
expensive activity to put them within a single system.
Therefore it turned out to be more economical to build
smaller systems, and re-use the existing alarm analysis
expert system, and allow them to be integrated through a
DAI framework. A DAI framework was needed because
the interactions between these subsystems were both
sophisticated and context dependent, therefore run time
reasoning based on dynamic data needed to be performed.
(ii) Robustness: As the subsystems have overlapping
domains of expertise, the failure of one of them to produce
an answer does not necessarily mean that no solution will be
forthcoming because one of the other systems may be able to
produce at least a partial solution. However to achieve this
back-up functionality in a flexible manner, the different
problem solving components need to be intelligently coordi-
nated - a task beyond present generation distributed
processing systems.
(iii) Reliability: The solutions of the systems that overlap can
be cross-referenced to enable the operator to be presented
with more reliable information. Again, however, this cross-
referencing functionality needs to be properly managed
according to the prevailing circumstances and so requires
dynamic and flexible reasoning to take place.
(iv) Natural representation of the domain: A DAI approach
accurately represents the way the control engineers work
when a large disturbance occurs. They specialize their roles
- one looks after restoration, another tries to diagnose the
problem based on different sources of information, and so on
- and they then communicate relevant information to one
another to ensure they are following a coherent course of
action towards the overall objective of restoring the service
(Jennings and Wittig, 1992).
Specification of the Agents
During normal working conditions, management of the net-
work by the operator in the DCR consists mainly of topology
changes (operation on breakers and switches), generation
scheduling, and control of the energy interchange with other
utilities (Corera et al., 1993). However, during emergency
situations management becomes considerably more difficult
because of the large number of constraints which have to be
taken into consideration and the insufficient quality of the
information which is available to make these decisions.
Emergency situations typically originate from a short circuit
in a line, bus-bar or transformer. They can be exacerbated by
equipment malfunctioning (eg a breaker failing to open) or
subsequent overloads (a domino effect can cause one line to
fail because of an overload, this in turn increases the load on
neighbouring lines so they become overloaded and subse-
quently fail, and so on). The situation can become even
worse if power stations become disconnected as this will
cause an imbalance in the network’s power. Consequently,
actions to restore service must be taken rapidly and accu-
rately, so that what starts as a relatively minor problem does
not escalate into a major disaster. In these circumstances, the
actions which the operator can perform consist mainly of
breaker operations, topology changes, and activation/deacti-
vation of automatisms and protective relays. For larger
disturbances, however, actions on power plants may also be
required.
From this description of the control engineer’s job, a top-
down analysis identified that a comprehensive decision sup-
port system should cover the following activities: (i) Detect
the existence of disturbances; sometimes the operation of
protective relays and breakers can be caused by routine
maintenance and this should not be confused with a genuine
disturbance situation; (ii) Determine the cause, location and
type of the disturbance; including identifying if any equip-
ment is permanently damaged; (iii) Analyse the situation of
the network once it arrives at a steady state; and (iv) Prepare
a restoration plan to return the network to its original opera-
tional state
Allying this top-down analysis with the bottom-up per-
spective of examining the extant systems, it was decided to
encapsulate the following pre-existing systems as agents -
the alarms analysis expert system and the interface to the
control system. As discussed earlier, the availability ofchronological alarm messages necessitated a new diagno-
sis system which it was decided to make available as an
agent. Finally, it was always known that information about
the initial area out of service (theblack out area) could help
constrain the search of the faulty equipment, however it
was never deemed cost effective to develop a dedicated
stand alone system for this purpose since the original alarm
analysis expert system’s performance was considered sat-
isfactory (if somewhat slow). However through the use of
DAI technology much of the basic infrastructure to imple-
ment this functionality was now available from other
agents and so it was considered economically viable to
develop a system capable of producing this information (in
terms of the ARCHON methodology, this decision corre-
sponds to providing additional functionality through the
development of new systems).
In more detail, the operational DAI system consists of
seven agents running on five different machines.
• BAI (Black-out Area Identifier) When a fault occurs, the
network’s protective relays and breakers automatically try
to isolate the minimum amount of equipment possible; in
an ideal case only the element at fault would be isolated.
The BAI’s objective is to identify which elements of the
network are initially out of service as the actual element at
fault must be within this region. It uses non chronological
alarm messages as its information source and cooperates
with the BRS and the AAA to increase the efficiency of the
overall diagnosis process.
• CSI (pre-existing Control System Interface) The CSI acts
as the application’s front end to the control system comput-
ers. Its objectives are to acquire and distribute network data
to the other agents, to interface to the conventional man-
agement system application programs, and to monitor the
restoration process to detect any unexpected deviations. It
is split into two physical agents: CSI-D which detects the
occurrence of disturbances and preprocesses the chrono-
logical and non chronological alarm messages which are
used by the AAA, the BAI and the BRS; and CSI-R which
detects and corrects inconsistencies in the snapshot data
file of the network, calculates the power flowing through it
and makes this information available to the SRA and the
UIA. CSI-D is primarily concerned with the system’s diag-
nosis activities and CSI-R with its restoration activities.
• BRS (Breakers and Relays Supervisor) The new alarms
analysis expert system which detects the occurrence of a
disturbance, determines the type of fault and its extent,
generates an ordered list of fault hypotheses, validates
hypotheses, and identifies malfunctioning equipment. In
order to perform its analysis, it takes two types of inputs:
chronological alarm messages and snapshots of the net-
work which give the status of every breaker and switch.
• AAA (pre-existing, non chronological Alarms Analysis
Agent expert system) This agent pursues similar goals to
the BRS, however the quality of information it receives is
inferior to that of the BRS. Although the alarm messages
received by both systems relate to the same physical oper-
ations, those received by the AAA represent ±5 seconds
accuracy, while those received by the BRS are precise.
This means that if the data is error free, then the BRS per-
forms a better diagnosis than the AAA. However if some of
the chronological information is lost (a distinct possibility
when the SCADA system is busy) then the BRS may per-
form worse than the AAA. Therefore whenever incomplete
or erroneous information exists, which is in most interest-
ing cases, there is a need for cooperation between the two
systems to make the overall system more robust and
reliable.
• SRA (Service Restoration Agent) This agent devises a serv-
ice restoration plan to return the network to a steady state
after a blackout has occurred. To do this it takes into account
the constraints imposed by the damaged equipment, as iden-
tified by the diagnosis agents.
• UIA (User Interface Agent) This agent implements the
interface between the users and the community of agents. It
gives the user the facility to inspect the results produced by
the diagnosis agents, display the alarms received, and browse
through the log of analysed disturbances. From the point of
view of restoration, the user can see the plan produced, mod-
ify it, run it in a simulated environment to see its predicted
effect, and request the development of a new restoration plan
which takes into account some actions which he deems per-
tinent. Through the use of a distributed windowing system,
the UIA presents the appropriate information on the consoles
of the various control engineers who are working on the
system.
This system design ensures that all the tasks identified by
the top-down analysis are performed by at least one agent.
Robustness is achieved by having multiple agents that are
able to provide the same (or at least some) overlapping
results. Efficiency is obtained by the parallel activation of
tasks. Reliability is increased because even if one of the
agents breaks down the rest of the agents can often produce
a result which, although not as good as the one provided by
the complete system, is still of use to the operator.
Cooperative Scenarios
An important example of cooperation in this system
involves the information interchange between the AAA,
BRS and BAI agents. The AAA and the BRS produce the
same result from different information sources, while the
BAI applies different knowledge to produce a result that
should be coherent with that of the AAA and the BRS.
Assume a block of non-chronological alarm messages has
been provided by the SCADA system and these alarm mes-
sages have been identiﬁed as related to a disturbance by the
CSI. Using the interest descriptors of its acquaintance mod-
els - see the AIM section - the CSI will realise that this
information is relevant to the AAA and the BAI. Applica-
tion of the appropriate PCM generic rule will result in this
information voluntarily being sent to the speciﬁed agents as
unsolicited data. Some time later, the same process will be
repeated and the BRS will receive the corresponding chro-
nological alarm messages. At this point, the AAA, BAI and
BRS are all operating in parallel.
When the AAA receives the alarm messages, and the cor-
responding disturbance identiﬁer marks them as being a
consequence of a new fault (see ﬁgure 4), the StartNew-
Diagnosis plan is executed and a preliminary set of
hypotheses (GENERATED-HYPOTHESES) are produced.
During this time, the BAI would also have received the
alarm messages and would have started its skill for produc-
ing the Initial-Black-Out-Area. When this plan is
complete, the BAI’s PCM checks whether any other agents
are interested in this information - it ﬁnds out that the AAA
is and so it sends out the information.
Simultaneously, altough after a certain delay, the BRS
agent starts working on the analysis of the chronological
alarm messages. This will also result in a list of GENER-
ATED-HYPOTHESES being produced. The BRS checks
whether any agents are interested in this information - again
the AAA is noted and the generated hypotheses are sent to
it. The BRS then continues with its diagnosis to try and vali-
date the cause of the fault.After producing its tentative list of hypotheses, the AAA
proceeds with a detailed analysis to try and ascertain the
precise cause of the fault (i.e. to produce VALIDATED-
HYPOTHESES). The following situations may then occur:
(i) the Initial-Black-Out-Area is available to the
AAA, this triggers a reﬁnement behaviour which may
reduce the number of hypotheses to be validated because
the BAI has given a focused view of the situation; (ii) the
generated hypotheses provided by the BRS are available
to the AAA, this triggers another reﬁnement behaviour
and obtains a better reordering of the hypotheses to be val-
idated and a beneﬁt in ﬁnding the element at fault; (iii) the
validated hypotheses provided by the BRS are available to
the AAA, this triggers yet another reﬁnement behaviour,
which has the same functionality as the previous one, but
the reordering is based on validated hypotheses which are
more accurate; (iv) if no information is available from the
BAI or BRS, the AAA proceeds with its hypotheses vali-
dation as a standalone agent. Therefore, if the other agents
are down or they are too slow to provide the information,
the AAA will continue and ﬁnd a faulty element although
its diagnosis will be less reliable and will take longer.
The restoration process is activated whenever a distur-
bance is detected. Once the disturbance is identified, the
disturbance identifier is sent to the CSI-R which acquires
the snapshot of the network, corrects any inconsistencies
which have arisen in its representation, and calculates the
power flow solution of the current state. This information
is then passed onto the SRA so that it can prepare for its res-
toration planning. The SRA waits until the diagnosis agents
have informed it of the element suspected of being at fault
(VALIDATED-HYPOTHESES) and then proceeds to pre-
pare a restoration plan. If, during this plan preparation, the
SRA is informed that the equipment at fault is different
from that originally indicated by either the AAA or the
BRS, then it replans the restoration taking this information
into account.
The UIA is the interface through which the user accesses
the results produced by the agent community. During the
diagnosis phase, the user is presented with both the tenta-
tive (early) list of suspected hypotheses and the final
(validated) list. During the restoration phase, the UIA sup-
ports a more participatory interaction between the user and
the agent community. The user is presented with the resto-
ration plan and can then decide to modify it, run a detailed
simulation to see the effects of the plan on the state of the
network or ask for a new plan to be devised taking into
account new constraints which he specifies. The UIA also
supports a reporting functionality in that the control engi-
neer can ask for the logs of the disturbances to be presented
and analysed.
Observations and Reflections
This application has been in operation in Iberdrola’s North
DCR since the beginning of 1994 and has afforded a
number of benefits. Firstly, the agent system gives better
results than its stand alone counterparts because it takes
multiple types of knowledge and data into account and then
integrates them in a consistent manner. Secondly, the agent
system is more robust because there are overlapping func-
tionalities which means partial results can be produced in
the case of component (agent) failure. Thirdly, some results
can be provided more quickly because cooperation pro-
vides a short cut (see previous section). Fourthly, the
functionalities of the different domain systems can be
increased independently which makes them easier to main-
tain (see, for example, the argument for developing the BAI).
Fifthly, the control engineer is provided with an integrated
view of the results he is interested in. Finally, the system has
been designed to be open so that new agents can be added in
an incremental manner.
One of the key features of this multi-agent system is the
way it handles fault diagnosis by using two different types of
data (the non-chronological alarms used by the AAA and the
chronological alarms used by the BRS) and two different
points of view (the typical diagnosis approach of hypothesis
generation and validation used by the AAA and BRS, and the
BAI’s monitoring approach which provides a high level view
of the status of the network). With this set-up, it is possible
to dynamically select the solution method which is best
suited to the current situation. For example, if the BRS is
operational, but the AAA is not, the solution provided to the
control engineer is the one created by the BRS; but if both the
BRS and the AAA are running, the solution provided is the
one which is mutually agreed between them. Also the fact
that multiple agents are trying to generate the same results
can be exploited to avoid repetition of certain tasks if it is
deemed desirable in a particular context. For example both
the AAA and the BRS can provide GENERATED-HYPOTH-
ESES, consequently if the generated hypotheses that are
provided by the BRS are available to the AAA before it starts
its own generation task, then this task need not be executed
and the hypotheses provided by the BRS can be used instead
(see figure 3). This ability to flexibly manage, at runtime,
multiple sources of data and multiple problem solving per-
spectives provides enormous robustness to the overall
system because if one of the agents crashes the others will
still be able to provide some form of solution.
As a consequence of the experience obtained during the
development and installation of this multi-agent system,
some important application design improvements are fore-
seen for the future. The first drawback of the current system
is caused by the fact that the energy transport network covers
a vast geographic area (meaning there is a huge amount of
topological information) and that it encompasses a number
of different voltage levels. As the network’s behaviour
depends both on the voltage level and the geographic loca-
tion, the main problem solving agents (the AAA, BRS, BAI
and SRA) have to contain and manage information about
Iberdrola’s entire transport network. This means the agents
require a substantial amount of memory and computing
resource because their searches are through such a large
problem space. To combat this problem, the next version of
the system will be designed so that the agents work with
smaller portions of the network; this will make them easier
to debug and maintain, faster in execution, and more cost
effective in that they could run on PCs instead of
workstations.
The second drawback of the current system is that all the
agents have uniform knowledge of the network. For instance,
the AAA applies virtually the same knowledge about protec-
tive relays to its 400 kV, 220 kV and 132 kV voltage levels.
However, if there were one AAA (or BRS or SRA) per volt-
age level, it would be possible to customise their domain
knowledge. For example, the following pieces of potentially
useful knowledge could be reflected: the fact that protective
relays on the 400 kV voltage level are more reliable than the
ones at 132 kV voltage level, and the fact that the 400 kV net-
work is more interconnected than the 132 kV network and
has more complex breaker structures (like central breakers or
rings of breakers). A further source of heterogeneity which iscurrently masked is that the network itself is the result of
the fusion of a number of smaller transport networks that
were developed by different companies before coming
under the overarching umbrella of Iberdrola. Thus, for
example, the protective relays of the Northwestern
Iberdrola network are different from the protective relays
in the rest of the network. Again this information could be
exploited if smaller and more specialised agents were
developed.
On a more general note, although the ARCHON
approach was influenced to a large extent by the need to
incorporate pre-existing industrial control software into a
multi-agent community, it is felt that cooperative inter-
working, heterogeneity, semi-autonomy, and loose
coupling are attributes that are likely to be encountered
when building most complex systems (even if they are built
entirely from scratch and are not deliberately conceived as
DAI systems). This belief is based on three main observa-
tions. Firstly, most large organisations, where the majority
of complex systems reside, have departmental structures
which need to be observed, but the individuals within these
structures often need to work together in a coherent man-
ner. Secondly, the components (including both the humans
and the software) within an organisation, and even within a
department, are likely to be heterogeneous simply because
each one has to be based upon a different modelling para-
digm in order to be effective. Finally, complexity is best
handled by devolving responsibility for decisions to the
level at which the actions are performed (hence the prob-
lem solvers will be loosely coupled and semi-autonomous).
In most cases the domain systems that already existed
were each fairly complex and had been designed to encom-
pass those aspects of the domain that could be expressed
within a coherent modelling paradigm. They were
designed in this manner because conventional wisdom dic-
tates that when building a system using a particular
modelling approach, one should include everything that is
known about the system’s world that can be expressed
within that model. However, after due reflection and obser-
vation it is noted that once several such conventional
systems are brought together into a cooperative frame-
work, then completeness and comprehensiveness are no
longer the key criteria for allocating agents. In a multi-
agent system, questions of the efficiency of the overall sys-
tem are likely to be paramount. This, in turn, may dictate
that an agent is identified with the smallest possible coher-
ent and autonomous entity. As a consequence the system
may have a large number of such agents which may, in
turn, have an implication on the performance of the overall
system. The ARCHON experience as yet does not extend
to systems with many (hundreds) of agents, however it is
likely that in such situations the designer may need to con-
sider if some of the smaller agents need to be coalesced
again.
Other important experiences from this work are that: (i)
speed of operation is a factor even where the real-time
requirements of the underlying processes are longer than
milliseconds (because a great many concurrent processes
are active and their interactions are cumulative); (ii) pass-
ing of intermediate results (or progress reporting) is an
effective means of increasing system parallelism; (iii) data
which is exchanged between agents ought to have a degree
of persistence so that troubleshooting can take place and
audit records can be maintained; (iv) significant improve-
ments in the overall application can be obtained through
relatively straightforward cooperative interactions. Finally,
it is important that a clear and detailed DAI methodology is
worked out, especially in view of the above discussion about
agent granularity - ARCHON’s informal hybrid approach is
an important first step in this direction but it needs to be made
more rigourous and have an even clearer link to the software
development process.
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